There is increasing discussion globally of the value of health-related food taxes and subsidies to address obesity and noncommunicable diseases. In order for such policies to be successful it is important to understand the positions of key stakeholders. This research investigated New Zealand (NZ) stakeholders' views on the feasibility and acceptability of selected health-related food taxes and subsidies over the next 5 to 10 years. Twenty semi-structured interviews were undertaken by telephone from November 2014 to May 2015. The purposive sample of key stakeholders included politicians, bureaucrats, public health experts, food industry leaders and consumer representatives. Prior to interviews participants were sent summary information on the estimated impacts of a range of health-related food taxes and subsidies on dietary intake and mortality. According to key stakeholders there appears to be little appetite for taxes on foods high in saturated fat or salt in NZ. Stakeholders largely agreed that a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) and a subsidy on fruit and vegetables were both feasible and likely acceptable. There was strong support for starting with a SSBs tax, possibly framed around protecting children and dental health. Addressing obesity and noncommunicable diseases is a multidimensional challenge. A tax on SSBs and a subsidy on fruit and vegetables, possibly in tandem, could be part of the solution in NZ. There is growing interest in, and evidence for, health-related taxes and subsidies internationally. Given the critical role of stakeholder support for such policies similar research on stakeholders' views may assist the implementation of health-related food taxes and subsidies in other jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION
Taxes and subsidies on food are receiving increasing attention internationally as interventions to reduce morbidity and mortality from obesity and noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) (United Nations General Assembly, 2011; Hawkes et al., 2015) . Further, there is a growing body of evidence supporting their effectiveness in improving diets (Thow et al., 2014; Ni Mhurchu et al., 2015; Colchero et al., 2016; Smed et al., 2016) . The World Health Organization (WHO) Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity notes "the rationale for taxation measures to influence purchasing behaviours is strong and supported by the available evidence "(World Health Organization Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity 2016, p. 18). A number of countries have introduced such measures (World Cancer Research Fund, 2016) , including a saturated fat tax in Denmark (Smed et al., 2016) , a tax on foods high in sugar, salt and caffeine in Hungary, a confectionary tax in Finland (World Cancer Research Fund, 2016 ) and a sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) tax in 12 Pacific Island Countries and Territories (MacDonald, 2015) and Mexico (Colchero et al., 2016 ). Mexico's 10% excise tax on SSBs, introduced in 2014, is collected from manufacturers. It resulted in a 12% decline in purchases, and 17% decline in low socioeconomic groups (Colchero et al., 2016) . The UK has announced it will impose a SSBs tax from 2018 (Her Majesty's Treasury, 2016) .
Introducing health-related taxes and subsidies on food is a highly political endeavour. It challenges the interests of a powerful and diverse food industry whose profit motive can be in direct conflict with public health goals (Chan, 2013) . For example, the Danish tax was repealed 15 months after its introduction amid political controversy, despite subsequent evidence of its effectiveness (Smed et al., 2016) . It has been suggested that this was, at least in part, due to its lack of 'strong proponents and many influential adversaries' (Vallgå rda et al., 2015, p. 223) . In order for such policies to be successful it is important to understand the positions of key stakeholders to gather support, address genuine concerns and counter vested interests (Signal, 1998) .
However, to our knowledge there is little research that captures the views of a range of stakeholders regarding health-related food taxes and subsidies. This research examined New Zealand (NZ) stakeholders' views on the practicable feasibility and likely acceptability of selected health-related food taxes and subsidies over the next 5 to 10 years.
NCDs are the leading cause of death in NZ (World Health Organization, 2014) and obesity rates are high, placing NZ third in the OECD (OECD, 2014) , with indigenous, Pacific and the most deprived New Zealanders carrying the heaviest burden (Ministry of Health, 2015) . NZ has a unicameral political system and mixed-member proportional representation (MMP); a universal 15% goods and services tax (GST), except for housing and financial transactions; and an economy dominated by primary production of food, particularly dairy, fruit, vegetables and meat. NZ politics has been dominated by neo-liberalism since 1984, and the current government is centre-right (Signal et al., 2015) .
METHODS
This study utilized the key informant or stakeholder interview method developed in anthropology (Tremblay, 1957) and now increasingly used in health promotion and public health (Signal et al., 2018) . Key informants are defined as 'privileged witnesses, or people who, because of their position, activities or responsibilities, have a good understanding of the problems to be explored' [Translation] (Laforest and Bouchard, 2009, p. 2) .
In policy research, such as this study, stakeholder interviews provide access to specialist knowledge that cannot be obtained by other methods and allow exploration of the feasibility of policy options (Signal et al., 2018) . In order to fully understand the issues in a policy arena, it is vital to gain the perspectives of a range of policy players. Therefore, a purposive sampling method was employed (Bryman, 2012) . Interviews were sought with equal numbers of leading politicians, bureaucrats, food industry leaders, public health experts and consumer representatives. Twenty semi-structured interviews were undertaken (by LS, CW and CM) with politicians (n ¼ 3), bureaucrats (n ¼ 4), public health experts (n ¼ 7) and food industry leaders (n ¼ 5) and a consumer representative (n ¼ 1). Interviews were conducted by telephone from November 2014 to May 2015.
Participants were identified based on the networks of the wider research team and use of a snowball technique, an approach where 'the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and uses these to establish contacts with others' (Bryman, 2012, p. 202) . In this study, the process was used iteratively throughout. Each participant was asked to identify other key informants and recommendations checked against the initial list to ensure the desired range of stakeholders, and any key omissions, was included. Of the 29 people invited to participate, six declined, two said they were not appropriate to be interviewed and one did not return our calls. In total, there were 22 participants as the consumer and one food industry interview were each conducted with two people. In these two cases, due to a high level of agreement, findings are reported together.
Prior to interviews participants were sent summary information on the estimated impacts of a range of health-related food taxes and subsidies on NZ adult dietary intakes and mortality from previous related research (Ni Mhurchu et al., 2015) (Table 1 ). In the case of the soft drink tax, the information was derived from international evidence and not from national modelling results. All others were assessed using a 'macrosimulation model based on household expenditure data, demand elasticities and population impact fractions for 18 diet-related diseases. . .. Changes in mortality from cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes and other diet related diseases were estimated' (Ni Mhurchu et al., 2015) . An interview schedule was used to guide the conversation (Table 2) . Questions focused on the information provided on each tax or subsidy in turn. The information was outlined again, and in more detail for those who had not had time to review it. Questions explored the tax or subsidy's practical feasibility (evidence of effectiveness, contextual issues, what to tax/ subsidise, ease of implementation, cost of administration) and acceptability to key sectors (public, politicians from various parties, the food industry and public health groups) over the next 5 to 10 years in NZ. Questions also explored what support would be required for implementation, and equity considerations. The longer timeframe was used in order to move informants' responses from the immediate political context. All interviews were taped with permission. Data was transcribed then coded and analysed (by LS and CW) using thematic analysis (Bryman, 2012) 
RESULTS
Findings are presented below. Quotes are used to illustrate key points. The stakeholder position and interview number are noted in brackets. To facilitate ready comparison the findings are summarized in Table 3 .
Soft drink tax
Feasibility A soft drink tax was considered feasible by the majority of stakeholders, except bureaucrats. Stakeholders largely agreed that while more evidence of effectiveness would be useful, there was little available. A number of stakeholders were awaiting outcomes from the Mexican SSBs tax, which were not published at the time (Colchero et al., 2016) . One bureaucrat noted the value of evidence of the impact on the economy and productivity. Two participants suggested that the problem was not the need for more evidence. As one politician noted 'there isn't more evidence that would change it. So, it may be dressed up as an evidence issue but that's not really it at all. The real problem is industry' (Politician 16). Further, there was concern regarding the impact of a tax on the overall diet, i.e. potential switching to equally unhealthy untaxed products.
There was general agreement that a soft drink tax would be the easiest intervention to implement of the ones examined. It was agreed that it would be possible to impose an excise tax, such as that on alcohol, as occurs in New Zealand (New Zealand Customs Service). Supporting arguments included that soft drinks are not a core food, they do not contain essential nutrients, and the impact of the tax would be limited to a small range of products and not across the food supply. There was concern by one bureaucrat that the tax may not be passed through to consumers, though they suggested a minimum price on product would avoid this. Five people commented on the administrative load of such a tax. A bureaucrat and food industry leader were concerned the load would be high. Alternatively, two public health experts and a politician argued it would not be overly difficult. A number of people made equity arguments. Four argued that the tax would be regressive but there was much to be gained for health amongst the poorest. Four noted that soft drinks are cheaper than healthy alternatives, suggesting that a tax would assist in adjusting this anomaly, including one consumer, one politician, and one food industry leader.
There did not appear to be any major issues in the NZ context that impacted on the feasibility of implementing this tax. One public health expert concluded that, 'there's no question that it's feasible because government is able to impose an excise tax. It does it for other goods' (Public Health Expert 4).
Acceptability
The majority of stakeholders agreed a soft drink tax would be acceptable to the public in the next 5 to 10 years (n ¼ 7), or might be-if framed in a compelling way (n ¼ 6). Three disagreed; two industry leaders and one bureaucrat. Those who thought it would be acceptable came from all stakeholder categories, including one from industry. Five participants (three public health experts, the consumer representative and one politician), argued that there is a shift in public opinion underway. As one noted, 'there's a general increasing awareness about sugar and the contribution of sugar to obesity and diabetes' (Public Health Expert 3). Barriers to public acceptability were public resistance to state interference (one politician and one food industry leader) and lack of knowledge about the likely health gain of such a tax (one politician, one food industry leader and one public health expert). There was general agreement that the public health community supported such a tax. As one public health expert noted, 'the public health and health professions are with one voice on this' (Public Health Expert 4).
The majority of stakeholders (including three from the food industry) agreed the tax would not be acceptable to the food industry. Stakeholders noted major opposition was likely from the Food and Grocery Council (the industry association that represents manufacturers and suppliers of New Zealand's food, beverage, and grocery brands), the big brand soft drink manufacturers, and the advertising industry. Three stakeholders, including one food industry leader, said it may be acceptable, noting the availability of alternative products. One bureaucrat noted that industry opposition, 'might not be as strong as you think, given that there are good substitutes for sugar ' (Bureaucrat 12) .
No stakeholders thought the tax would be acceptable to the current Government. One consumer representative and one politician noted that, 'many of their [the Government's] key people are high up in the food industry' (Politician 20). The consumer representative continued, 'they [industry] are incredibly influential and this government is persuaded by the arguments that they put up' (Consumer 6). Eight stakeholders argued that a soft drink tax was possible with a change in Government to the left. However, a consumer representative warned about the power of industry, 'the hugely influential weight of the industry, you know, they're in there lobbying the government all the time' (Consumer 6).
There was limited comment on acceptability to the public service. However, as one bureaucrat noted 'if government departments know their ministers are philosophically opposed to something then they don't push those ideas very hard so there is a bit of self-censoring' (Bureaucrat 12). One public health expert argued that 'the [officials] in Treasury are your biggest problem' (Public Health Expert 3). Two bureaucrats noted support from the Prime Minister's Chief Science Advisor would be helpful (Sir Professor Peter Gluckman, cochair of the WHO Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity).
Support for implementation
Most stakeholders spoke of a sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax rather than a soft drinks tax. Seven stakeholders specifically noted that it was an issue not including non-fizzy SSBs (e.g. juices and flavoured milks), including three food industry leaders, two public health experts, one politician and one bureaucrat. In relation to widening the scope of the tax, one food industry stakeholder commented that 'it needs to be a level playing field' (Food Industry 18). Four stakeholders advocated framing the argument around protecting children, a food industry leader, two public health experts and one bureaucrat. Four mentioned the link to dental health would strengthen the case, two public health experts, a politician and a food industry leader.
There was agreement from all stakeholder groups on the need to increase public support for such a tax in order to shift political support. Four public health experts and two politicians argued for a campaign to increase support for a SSBs tax. 'Someone has to organise a campaign, which is directed both at building public support and media support and working on susceptible politicians' (Public Health Expert 10). As one public health expert noted, 'it comes back to getting the public opinion to such a high level that it becomes irresistible [to politicians]' (Public Health Expert 17). Potential campaign leaders identified by one stakeholder included 'paediatricians, the NZ Dental Association and interested child advocacy bodies' (Public Health Expert 10). According to one public health expert 'most New Zealanders have no idea how much sugar there is in their common food items' (Public Health Expert 3). A number discussed promoting healthy alternative drinks such as water and low fat milk. As one public health expert stated, 'what's needed to support its implementation is the problem of child obesity per se needs to be turned into an issue which lands on a politician's desk. So at the moment it's not really perceived as an issue which demands attention' (Public Health Expert 4).
A SSBs tax was supported by public health experts as a good starting point in terms of health-related food taxes. As one noted, 'I think starting with the soft drink tax is the obvious place to go, it's fairly popular overseas. I mean if the groundswell got big enough, then you might jump all the way to a junk food tax straight away, but I think it's more feasible just like with smoking, these things started small'(Public Health Expert 11). However, one politician warned that 'it's going to be a long hard battle, the same as the long hard battle on tobacco' (Politician 14). Nevertheless, an incremental approach was supported. One public health expert noted, as taxes started being put on cigarettes we started to see things like the smokefree fund set up, and see how the money is spent, which brings positive benefits too. I mean, I think you could spend the money from a tax on soft drinks on setting up a nutrition programme in schools, or a junk free brand, to replace soft drink advertising, things like that. And then I think, you know, people will see the benefits of that and be prepared to go wider (Public Health Expert 11).
Fruit and vegetable subsidy
Feasibility A fruit and vegetable subsidy was seen as feasible by nine stakeholders from a range of sectors, five public health, two food industry leaders, one consumer representative and one politician. Participants often perceived this as a removal of GST on fruit and vegetables due to NZ's universal 15% GST system. Those who found it feasible cited other countries where GST is not imposed on staple food such as fruit and vegetables.
Three people argued it was not feasible (a public health expert, a food industry leader and a politician) and five were unsure due to the difficulties they perceived with enacting it, two food industry leaders, one public health expert and two politicians. Difficulties included the cost of administration and the complexity of defining what the tax covered, e.g. would dried, processed, canned and frozen fruit and vegetables be included. Three stakeholders were concerned that the subsidy would be inequitable, that it 'disproportionately benefits people who are better off' (Bureaucrat 7). Two people were concerned about whether it was the best spend in this arena because of the foregone government income, one public health expert and one politician. As the politician said, 'it's a bad use of tax revenue when there's so many other things that can be done with it' (Politician 14).
Acceptability
All ten stakeholders who commented agreed that a subsidy on fruit and vegetables would be acceptable to the public, five public health experts, two food industry leaders, the consumer representative and a bureaucrat.
There were mixed views on political acceptability. Four argued it would be acceptable (three food industry leaders and one bureaucrat), two were unsure (a public health expert and a bureaucrat) and two argued it would not be (a public health expert and a politician). This was due to complexity, cost, or, as one public health expert noted, 'the current government are free market people and they don't want to be seen to be meddling in the market' (Public Health Expert 3). Three public health experts identified opposition from Treasury, one noting the opportunity cost and another the general reluctance to 'mess with our tax structure' (Bureaucrat 7). Six stakeholders (including three from the food industry) argued that a subsidy on fruit and vegetables would be acceptable to the food industry, or at least parts of it such as the fruit and vegetable producers. One public health expert noted that 'I don't know that the public health community is united on this one as the evidence is mixed' (Public Health Expert 4).
Support for implementation
There was less discussion of implementation in relation to this measure than for a SSBs tax. However, one public health expert argued that, here's a situation where the public health people could well mount a very good case with the fruit and vege [sic] producers on side and the consumer groups somehow again, forcing government to take action. So I think, unlike the soft drink tax, it might well be good news all around (Public Health Expert 4).
Two stakeholders suggested combining this subsidy with a SSBs tax so that the losses due to the subsidy would be offset by the tax revenue. Alternatively, two public health experts argued for a voucher system for those with greater need to avoid the universality of a subsidy.
Saturated fat tax
Feasibility A saturated fat tax was not considered feasible by almost all stakeholders because of the practical challenges posed. These include that saturated fat is a component of many core foods, questions regarding whether to tax at source, and whether such a tax would be reflected in the price passed through to consumers. Comments included, It is a much bigger beast and many-headed monster to try draw a ring around to collect tax. And in the end for some of those avenues, collecting tax won't get reflected in a price-differential at the point of purchase (Public Health Expert 4).
There was also confusion about the current debate in the media on the effects of saturated fat on health. Only one stakeholder, a consumer representative, thought that a fat tax might be feasible, and then with reservations. Stakeholders agreed that there was not good evidence internationally to support such a tax. Four people noted the apparent failure of the Danish fat tax (Vallgå rda et al., 2015) , three public health experts and one bureaucrat. As one public health expert noted, 'it's got such a bad press from Denmark. The Danish experience probably set this area back by a decade I would expect' (Public Health Expert 10). However, three public health experts noted that the reasons for the failure of the Danish tax needed to be investigated. Two people were concerned that such a tax would make core foods unaffordable, a consumer and one food industry leader.
Acceptability
Overall, a fat tax was not seen as acceptable by any stakeholders, although one bureaucrat noted support from vegetarians and people interested in sustainability. A politician stated that 'there will be parts of the industry that may be possible to work with to find some allies' (Politician 16). While one bureaucrat considered that fat was seen as 'bad in the public mind' (Bureaucrat 2) no one noted public support for a fat tax, in part because it would put the cost of food up 'across the board' (Consumer Representative 6) and impact on lower income families (Food Industry Leader 9) . A range of six stakeholders saw major opposition from industry, particularly the dairy and meat industry. As one noted, It would certainly be like a red rag to a bull to the dairy and the meat industry. They would not be happy with it. And I suppose from a New Zealand Inc the fact that we are a big farm-selling dairy products, it doesn't look too good for the country if we think it's unhealthy and we are taxing it twenty percent. We sell all our saturated fat to other people. I think that would make it hard to sell. It would be controversial (Consumer Representative 6).
One public health expert noted 'this is clearly a case where a very powerful industry will resist all forms of limitation' (Public Health Expert 3). A food industry leader spoke of the 'the huge amount more political clout' the dairy industry has over other areas of the food industry in NZ and 'the importance of the dairy and meat industry for our country's economy' (Food Industry Leader 5). A public health expert discussed the power of the farming lobby,' you know a saturated fat tax is just going to [anger] the farmers, and we've seen with climate change how powerful a lobby they are. So, yeah I don't see it flying politically' (Public Health Expert 11). As a result, no one considered there would be political support for this proposal, although one politician noted that it 'would be easiest to convince the Greens' (Politician 14). As one stakeholder concluded, 'I think it would be impossible to sell' (Consumer Representative 6).
Support for implementation
In terms of implementation, one bureaucrat noted, 'it is too blunt a tool' (Bureaucrat 1). Three stakeholders suggested identifying some foods such as takeaways or generic junk food rather than saturated fat in the diet, one consumer, one public health expert and one bureaucrat.
Salt tax
Feasibility A salt tax was not seen as feasible by any stakeholders. Issues cited were a lack of international evidence of effectiveness, complexity of implementation as salt is ubiquitous across the food supply and the main contributors are core foods, and the difficulties around the type of tax. One public health expert suggested it may be possible to tax salt at source prior to its use in products.
Acceptability
Many stakeholders indicated that the idea of reducing salt was acceptable to consumers, including M aori and Pacific New Zealandders, public health experts and the industry. However, using a salt tax to achieve this was considered by the majority of stakeholders to be unacceptable to the public, the food industry and the current government.
Support for implementation
Product reformulation was seen by the majority of stakeholders as a more effective approach to reduce salt intake. A staged policy approach was widely supported, including government-set targets, maximum level per 100 g of a product and comprehensive monitoring, combined with the threat of taxation and incentives to decrease salt, one politician and one consumer representative. As one bureaucrat noted, 'sometimes the threat of it [taxation] is as important, or more effective than actually implementing it' (Bureaucrat 2).
Combined tax/subsidy
Feasibility While some stakeholders said the proposition of a combined tax/subsidy (a subsidy on fruit and vegetables and taxes on saturated fat, and salt) had a 'superficial attraction', (Bureaucrat 7) as it made logical sense as a nutrition message and could be cost neutral to consumers, there was limited support for this proposition. As one public health expert noted, 'I think it's a bridge too far. Government have a hard enough time accepting one intervention. It might work but I just think it's pushing it a bit too far' (Public Health Expert 3). The majority of stakeholders said it was not feasible, it was too complex to administer and that there was insufficient evidence that it would be effective. 'I just think it is an administrative nightmare' one bureaucrat noted (Bureaucrat 1).
Acceptability
There were mixed views on the acceptability of this proposition from those who commented and no agreement on where support might lie. One public health expert and one food industry leader argued it would be generally acceptable and one food industry leader and one bureaucrat argued it would not. In the consumer interview it was noted that the food industry might be divided in its support as 'fruit and vegetable growers would like it' (Consumer Representative 6).
Support for implementation
While support was limited for a combined subsidy on fruit and vegetables and taxes on fat and salt, there was some support for a combined fruit and vegetable subsidy and SSBs tax from public health experts, politicians and the food industry.
DISCUSSION
The majority of stakeholders considered a soft drink tax was feasible in the next 5 to 10 years in NZ. A soft drink tax was regarded as the easiest intervention to implement of those examined, in part because an excise tax could be imposed as occurs for other products in NZ such as alcohol (New Zealand Customs Service). Evidence of effectiveness was regarded by some as valuable, and this has emerged subsequently (Colchero et al., 2016) . A soft drink tax was viewed as likely acceptable to the public, the public health community, and potentially a left-leaning government but not to the food industry or the current centre-right government, findings consistent with other NZ evidence (Sundborn et al., 2015; Vandevijvere et al., 2015; Food and Grocery Council, No date; NZ Hearld, 2016) . Likewise, a fruit and vegetable subsidy was seen as feasible by many as these foods are not taxed in many other countries. There was some concern with the complexity of implementation and whether it would be inequitable, giving more benefit to better off consumers. A fruit and vegetable subsidy was largely regarded as acceptable to the public and the food industry, the latter finding perhaps not surprising in a country with a significant fruit and vegetable production sector. There were, however, mixed views on acceptability to the current government and the public health community.
Neither a saturated fat tax nor a salt tax were considered feasible due to the challenges of implementation and, in the case of a saturated fat tax, the lack of evidence of effectiveness. This has since been challenged by the evidence from Denmark (Smed et al., 2016) . A saturated fat tax was seen as unacceptable to all sectors. Again, the Danish experience demonstrates that politicians may be willing to enact such a tax, particularly if the health sector is in support (Vallgå rda et al., 2015) . However, the dominance of the dairy and meat industries in NZ, and their power with government (Signal et al., 2015) makes a fat tax unlikely in the foreseeable future. Consequently, a combined tax that included the subsidy and taxes on foods high in saturated fat and salt was deemed neither feasible nor acceptable.
In terms of implementation, there was strong support for starting with a SSBs tax, with some stakeholders suggesting it be framed around protecting children and linked to dental health. This appears to mirror international experience with many countries taking this step (World Cancer Research Fund, 2016) . There was agreement on the need to build public support for such a tax, something that appears to be growing in NZ since these interviews were conducted (Sundborn et al., 2015) . The agreement of the public health community for an SSBs tax bodes well, including recent support from the Prime Minister's Chief Science Advisor (World Health Organization Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity, 2016). NZ is therefore in a solid position on a SSBs tax with strong support. This is unlike Denmark with the fat tax where there was weak support, including divided opinion amongst Danish health leaders (Vallgårda et al., 2015) . The opposition of the food industry may be powerful in a food producing nation such as NZ, although there may be divisions even here. However, as WHO Director-General Margaret Chan states, Efforts to prevent noncommunicable diseases go against the business interests of powerful economic operators. . . . This is formidable opposition. . . . In the view of WHO, the formulation of health policies must be protected from distortion by commercial or vested interests (Chan, 2013) .
The Mexican evidence suggests that an SSBs tax will reduce consumption and will do so equitably, with those with most to gain, the poor who endure the most obesity, benefiting more (Colchero et al., 2016) . In NZ's 'Wellington variant of the Westminster system' (Martin and Salmond, 2001 ) policy can be made quickly, and with a 3 year election cycle and an MMP political system change can occur rapidly. It seems likely, that a SSBs tax will prove to be both feasible and acceptable in NZ in the next few years. Support for a subsidy on fruit and vegetables was also quite strong, although possibly in tandem with a SSBs tax rather than the alternatives proposed here. While there was support for reduction of salt in the diet, most stakeholders preferred a reformulation programme to a tax.
To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to capture the views of a diverse group of stakeholders to a range of health-related food taxes and subsidies. While every effort was made to have equal numbers of stakeholders from the key stakeholder groups, this was not possible. However, the sample included politicians from three leading political parties, although not the majority governing party, bureaucrats from Health and Treasury, public health experts and the food industry leaders. Consumer representation was poor, likely due to the lack of consumer voice on the issue in this country. Guaranteeing anonymity likely enabled the participants to speak more freely, particularly the bureaucrats who are bound by the public service code of conduct which requires them to express the policies of the government of the day. The strategic positions of the stakeholders, the range of their knowledge and their ability to reflect on the issue provided a rich data source that could not have been easily collected by other means (Signal et al., 2018) .
Providing participants with information on the estimated impact of particular taxes and subsidies on population health before the interview provided a good basis for discussion. However, participants did not discuss the summary information in any detail. Largely, they did not appear to form their arguments around the evidence, rather drawing on their own knowledge and expertize. This research suggests that while such information is a useful starting point it is not essential to have this level of detail in order to successfully interview key stakeholders on this issue.
The recent WHO Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity 'highlights the importance of leadership at the level of governments to provide an appropriate regulatory and statutory framework to tackle childhood obesity' (Gluckman et al., 2015) , and thus obesity across the population. Ending obesity and NCDs is a multidimensional challenge. According to key stakeholders there appears to be little appetite for a tax on saturated fat or salt in NZ in the next five to ten years. However, this research suggests there is considerable support from key stakeholders for a tax on SSBs and a subsidy on fruit and vegetables, possibly in tandem, as part of the solution in NZ. There is growing interest in, and evidence for, health-related taxes and subsidies (United Nations General Assembly, 2011; Thow et al., 2014; Colchero et al., 2016; World Cancer Research Fund, 2016) . Given the critical role of stakeholder support for such policies (Vallgå rda et al., 2015) , similar research on stakeholders' views may guide the implementation of healthrelated food taxes and subsidies in other jurisdictions.
